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REVISIONISM REVISED? AIRLINE DEREGULATION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST*
MICHAEL E. LEVINEt
From the Progressive Era through the 1950s, we thought we understood
regulation. It was generated, we knew, by problems with laissez-faire. These
problems came to be known as "market failures." Regulation operated to cure
market failures by substituting the expert planning decisions of an administrative
agency for the defective allocations of the failed market.' Regulators sifted facts,
rendered and explained their judgments, and generally did a creditable, if flawed
job, or so we thought. This view of the origins and operation of the process came
to be known as the "public interest" theory of regulation.
By the late 1950s, this view of the process began to change. An outpouring of
scholarly work continuing through the 1960s and into the 1970s suggested that
regulation did not work very well. As scholars examined the record of regulated
industries, they found prices which were too high or too low, distorted allocations,
mercantile protection, suppression of innovation, extension of regulation beyond
the bounds of any known market failure, and protection of entrenched interests,
corporate or geographic from any change at all costs.
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In the face of these discoveries, the public interest theory did not survive. The
scholarly view of the regulatory process changed from one of control of private
behavior for the public benefit to one of use of governmental powers for private or
sectional gain. 3 This pattern emerged frequently enough to inspire speculation
about the "true" sources of regulation and about the "true" motives of regulators.
While no single explanation gained unanimous acceptance, a kind of "cluster
consensus" appeared. This consensus characterized regulation as a device used by
relatively small subgroups of the general population, either private corporations or
geographic or occupational groups, to produce results favorable to them which
would not be produced by the market. The regulatory services provided were
variously described as organization of a cartel, wealth transfers as a form of
"taxation," enshrinement of capitalistic class interests, or preservation of congres-
sional and bureaucratic power.4 Of course, all gains, whether from regulation or
the market, are in a sense realized by private human beings. The operational
significance of this view of regulation is that government processes are used by
organized subgroups of the population to enforce inefficient arrangements which
transfer wealth or power to them. 5
By 1976, Roger Noll, in a survey of theories of regulation and administrative
behavior, could describe public interest theories as "traditional" and "no longer
widely shared."6 Another commentator began a 1977 article on regulation as
follows: "It seems fair to say that among economists the most widely accepted
theory of government regulation is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry regulated and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."' 7 Ironi-
cally, as this new academic consensus emerged, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) deregulated brokerage commissions, a thirty-five-year-old sys-
tem of agriculture price supports was largely dismantled, airlines were deregulated,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) deregulated the communications
equipment business and cable television and began to consider (along with Con-
gress) deregulating common-carriage message service, and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) and the Senate started to deregulate trucking. None of
these events is predicted or explained very well by revisionist theories of regula-
tion. At a minimum, some modification of revisionist theory is called for. Alternatively,
one arguably might predict and explain this activity by reviving the public interest
3. For a useful analysis of the shift from public interest theories of regulation to revisionist theories,
see Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECoN. & MG.MT. Sci. 335 (1974).
4. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & Econ. 211 (1976); Posner, Taxation
by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. So. 22 (1971); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J.
Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
5. This article focuses specifically on price and entry regulation of the traditional variety. Many of the
basic revisionist insights (and the modifications here) apply as well to safety and environmental regulation
(e.g., Peltzman's analysis of the 1962 FDA amendments, supra note 2), but in focusing on the CAB, this
article leaves for subsequent efforts detailed application of its thesis to externality, informational and
safety regulation.
6. R. Noll, Government Administrative Behavior and Private Sector Response: A Multidisciplinary
Survey, California Institute Social Science Working Paper 62, 12 (1976) (available from Division of
Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California).
7. Migu6, Controls Versus Subsidies in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 2( J. L. & ECgoN. 213 (1977).
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theory of regulation in a modified form: namely, by asserting that both Congress
and agencies attempt to regulate business activities to promote general welfare, but
are sometimes misled by private or sectional misrepresentations designed to secure
governmental action favoring more narrow populations. Although these attempts
to influence the regulatory process may succeed at first for Downsian 8 reasons,
mistakes (whether ab initio or generated over time by technical or circumstantial
changes) tend to be publicized and corrected. If true, this view of regulation would
require us once again to recast the way we look at regulation.
Since the purpose of this article is to rescue for reexamination a widely
discarded public interest theory, I do not propose to pursue in detail here the
modifications of revisionist theory. There are, however, modification strategies
which might suggest themselves to one so inclined: One could, for example,
attempt to reconcile recent deregulations with revisionist theory by asserting that
scholarly work assessing the effects of regulation makes information on its impact
available to the electorate at lower cost than previously, thus reducing the invest-
ment necessary to becoming an informed voter. Abetting this, one might argue
that increasing over time the educational level of the electorate has further lowered
the cost of informing voters. And finally, one might argue that modifying Downs'
model to eliminate a principal weakness, namely its inconsistency in dealing with
the fact that many people vote who "shouldn't",9 ' by positing an electorate educated
to value voting intrinsically might reduce even further (by creating economies of
scale in voting once they have decided to go to the polls) the cost to consumers of
casting one of many votes against regulatory policies with adverse but diffuse
effects on them.
An important feature of this last approach is that it assumes "public," rather
than private, motivation (voting as a public obligation on issues of low salience
under circumstances where no individual vote is likely to make a difference to the
outcome) on the part of voters and hence weakens a linchpin of Downsian analysis.
In particular, if the private maximizing assumption can be modified to accommo-
date otherwise "irrational" citizen voting, on what grounds can we exclude modify-
ing assumptions about politician behavior to include political activities undertaken
for generalized public, rather than concentrated private, gain? To open up this
possibility is to propose to "save" revisionist theory by partially abandoning its most
characteristic assumption. Such a modified Downsian approach then tends to
converge with the sort of Downs-modified public interest theory discussed in this
article. In this sense, the analysis put forward below not only further develops
public interest theories but can also be useful in refining Downsian approaches
8. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, at chs. 6, 13 (1957).
9. Downs himself acknowledges that a voting population following his model would have difficulty
sustaining democracy because few rational voters would find it in their interest to vote (A. DowNs, supra
note 8, at 267-70. He deals with the problem by postulating an interest in long-term survival of democracy
which motivates some to vote. He calls this "long-run participation value," id. at 270. But, in the next
sentence, he recognizes that free-rider effects vitiate even this motivation for voting. Downs is finally left
with the bare assertion that at least some of the electorate will find it in their long or short-run self-interest
to vote, id. at 270-271.
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directly, even though direct exploration of modifications of Downsian theories is
outside the scope of this article.
This paper will focus on airline deregulation in an initial attempt to explore the
public interest hypothesis. To do so, we must develop at least a working definition
of "public interest" regulation and give operational meaning both to this definition
and to the revisionist theory in the specific context of airline deregulation. Then
we can look at the facts of airline deregulation to see which characterization best
fits and explains the events we have observed.' 0 If this inquiry establishes that a
revised version of the public interest theory is more consistent with recent airline
regulation evidence than are revisionist theories, examples from other agencies
should be examined in future work to see whether a general theory can be
supported.
There have been many contributors to the revisionist literature on regulation,
but examination of the literature exposes common themes arrayed along a central
line of development. The central notion underlying virtually all revisionist theory
comes from Downs." Downs posits a government run by individuals trying to
maximize a private, rather than public, utility function. In effect, he asks us to view
public officials not as officials primarily concerned with public matters, but rather
as private individuals trying to maximize their own utility much in the way a firm
maximizes profits. Just as businessmen compete with other businessmen to accumu-
late consumer dollars which will bring them wealth, politicians compete with each
other for electoral support which keeps them in office (their "wealth") and
bureaucrats deal with the public and the legislature to accumulate power, prestige,
tenure, et cetera. From this, it follows that public officials will try to assemble
coalitions of support. Individuals and groups support public officials whose actions
make those individuals or groups better off, either financially or by satisfying their
"tastes" for public policies.
But supporting an official-even if only by voting-entails costs which will be
borne willingly only if the payoff from a public policy to an individual or group
exceeds the cost of supporting the public official who will implement it. According-
ly, those willing to put the most effort into supporting public officials are those
whose gains from a particular policy most exceed the cost of implementing it, and
public officials can gain support best by inventing or supporting policies which
10. Rejecting capture versions of the revisionist theory and accepting their public interest predecesstor
are, of course, two distinct matters. One can view recent evidence as being inconsistent with those
revisionist theories which characterize agencies as providing a service for the industries they regulate
without being willing to rehabilitate public interest theories. See, e.g., Anderson, Who Owns the Regulators?,
4 WHARTON MAGAZINE 14-21 (1980) which uses recent history to reject the "capture" and "industry service"
theories, but goes on to elaborate a substitute that owes more to Niskanen (agencies operating to
maximize the amount of resources they control, NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTAriVE GOVERN-
MENT (1971)), Downs (regulators operating on their own behalf as private utility maximizers rewarded in
power and jobs, rather than as public welfare maximizers, A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY, 81-86 (1967)),
and Peltzman (agencies maximizing power and guaranteeing continued existence by intervening to
transfer wealth on behalf of interests identified according to specified variables, Peltzman, supra note 4)
than it does to any version of public interest theory.
11. A. DowNs, supra note 8.
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provide disproportionate benefits to groups who are in a position to affect political
outcomes by delivering votes (or money to attract votes) or by supporting the
activities of an agency.
Using this central notion, one can proceed to derive the central themes of the
revisionist view of regulation. Policies which generate economic profits (rents) are
likely to gain support from the groups in whose favor the profits will be distribut-
ed. One method of generating rents is to limit entry into an industry and to
facilitate price coordination. According to Stigler, groups which can benefit from
this kind of intervention use the political process to persuade legislators to create
regulatory agencies to accomplish it.' 2 These groups are ordinarily private firms. If
a group of users or a geographic area has low enough organization costs compared
to potential benefits from intervention, it too will influence the political process to
intervene in markets for the group's benefit. Generally, this intervention will take
the form of what Posner has called "taxation by regulation,"'" namely, use of the
regulatory process to generate monopoly profits from users who are not specially
organized in order to finance excess service (compared to revenues) for the
favored group or geographic area.
Kolko' 4 has developed a revisionist account of the origins of regulation which is
essentially Marxist in its use of class concepts, but which produces results strikingly
similar to the Downsian line of development. He posits capitalists who find market
competition unprofitable and consumer sovereignty unattractive and who seize
control of the apparatus of the state in order to establish and preserve monopoly
positions. In order to succeed politically in doing so, they exploit populist senti-
ment which favors controlling monopolies through regulation. Thus, regulatory
mechanisms are created, supposedly to satisfy popular demand, but actually to
permit capitalists to use the government to eliminate market forces which operate
to reduce their profits.
Revisionist accounts of the legislative origin of regulation are integrated with
revisionist accounts of agency-created regulation by Fiorina and Noll.1' They
describe a process in which legislators who want to be reelected discover that
individual service to constituents (and particularly help to constituents having
difficulty with government agencies) is a particularly effective form of vote-getting,
not least because it cuts across party lines and issue positions. At the same time,
bureaucrats who wish to continue in their jobs and who favor their own continued
intervention into the economy discover that it is in their interest to be responsive to
inquiries from legislators on behalf of their constituents. And, of course, potential
beneficiaries continue to be interested in interventions which will transfer wealth to
them. The result, as seen by Fiorina and Noll, is a powerful conjunction of forces
in favor of establishing and continuing regulation. Legislators, bureaucrats, and
favored constituents unite to create complex programs which transfer wealth. The
12. Stigler, supra note 4.
13. Posner, supra note 4.
14. G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION (1965): G. KOLKO, TtiF TRIL'MPI OF CONSERVATISM (1963).
15. Fiorina & Noll, Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections, 41 J. Poi.. 1031. 1099 (1976).
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legislator gets credit every time he helps a constituent deal with bureaucratic
complexity independently of the position he or the constituent take on the
desirability of the underlying program. The bureaucrat gets to run a bigger
program, organized in ways that increase his discretion. Any constituent benefited
by the program, of course, remains in favor of it. Any constituents who oppose a
program in general but who can benefit from assistance in dealing with it ignore
those general views in favor of supporting legislators whose help is financially more
salient to them-incumbents who know their way around the bureaucracy. So
powerful is this combination that Fiorina and Noll predict that rational legislators
will choose voluntarily to make a program of intervention more complicated,
discretionary, administrative, and "regulatory" than it need be to accomplish its
purpose, because doing so maximizes the political advantage to be gained from it.
In summary, examining revisionist theories of regulation, reveals a great many
common threads; revisionist theories owe a great deal to Downs. They posit groups
with relatively low organization costs relative to their possible gains from political
intervention who become disproportionately influential in the political process.
These groups persuade Congress to set up a framework which will transfer wealth
to them through the regulatory process. If the group is a private firm or firms, the
government service may take the form of a cartel run at public expense. If the
groups are user or geographic in nature, the regulation often will take the form of
what Posner has called "taxation," generating monopoly profits from some disfavored
sector of the public and transferring them as excess services for the benefit of the
favored sector. A Marxist such as Kolko may describe all this in class terms rather
than the more general Downsian analysis, but the end result is largely the same.
And, finally, Fiorina and Noll describe an elaborate interaction of legislators,
bureaucrats, and favored groups joining hands to achieve wealth transfers through
the regulatory process which will redound to the credit of the legislators and to the
vocational benefit of the bureaucrats.
These theories of regulatory genesis are closely related to theories of regulatory
behavior. The cartel theory of origin generates a corresponding view of agency
behavior which has a counterpart in the "capture" theory. 16 The capture theory
seems implicitly to accept the possibility of a public interest view of agency origin
16. M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). One anonymous
regulator described the operation of the capture process as follows:
It all begins when a fellow out in Indianapolis is designated to be a member of a regulatory
commission. First he gets into the going-away period. There are banquets in his honor, and the
women say to his wife, "For goodness sake, be sure to tell us what Pat is really like." She
demurely replies, "I am sure I won't see her often," believing, of course, that she will. After the
goodbyes, the fellow comes to Washington and assumes his role as a member of a commission,
believing that he is really a pretty important guy. After all, he almost got elected to Congress
back home in Indiana. He is used to public attention. But after a few weeks in Washington, he
realizes that nobody ever heard of him or cares much what he does-except one group of very
personable, reasonable, knowledgeable, delightful human beings, who recognize his true worth.
Obviously, they might turn his head just a bit.
R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 100 (1971).
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but postulates that, whatever the reasons that may have created a regulatory
agency, it becomes captured by the industry it regulates and acts as a protector and
cartel manager for that industry. A refinement of this view has the agency
operating to continually shift resources in somebody's favor, thus maximizing its
political power. The beneficiary of the wealth shift will change from producers to
consumers to subgroups of consumers, depending on demand shifts and technical
changes, but the wealth shifts will be undertaken without regard to efficiency.
17
This view, in turn, is buttressed by Fiorina's 18 general theory of the interaction
between Congress and bureaucrats. Fiorina postulates that legislators win reelection
by influencing governmental processes which affect wealth to operate in their
constituents' favor. For such influence to be possible, government intervention in
the form of regulation needs to exist and the regulators need to be cooperative in
the way they carry out their mandate. Thus, the "iron triangle ' ' 9 of legislators,
regulators, and beneficiaries affects the operations as well as the geneses of
regulatory agencies. Some theories of regulation postulate regulatory activity as an
essentially defensive response to external pressures or signals.2z Others have suggested
that regulation can be made so complex and formalized that it operates as an
employment project administered by and for the benefit of lawyers. 2 1 And Mashaw
has given an account of regulatory genesis and operation which combines problem
misperception, urgency, and misplaced confidence in government efficacy to pro-
duce regularized patterns of regulatory inefficiency.
22
The problem with these theories is that they cannot accommodate, or can
accommodate only with extreme difficulty, moves by regulators or Congress away
from regulation and toward efficiency and reduction in bureaucratic discretionary
power. The cartel theory and theories of bureaucratic power-maximizing and the
"iron triangle" do not seem to allow for reductions in the amount of regulatory
activity. Peltzman's more generalized wealth-transfer theory23 seems to allow for a
certain amount of bureaucratic (as distinct from legislative) transfers in favor of the
public, but not for relaxation of bureaucratic controls or dismantling of the
apparatus. Theories of agency reaction to outside pressure would not seem to
suggest deregulation in the face of strong unanimous industry opposition. The
lawyer-employment theory would account for deregulation activity only if lawyers
had a remarkably high discount rate and were prepared to accept gratefully the
jobs created by a major brawl over deregulation at the expense of the stream of
employment created by the continued existence of a regulatory agency and a Bar
to deal with it. And Mashaw's complicated account ends with a whimper rather
17. Peltzman, supra note 4.
18. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS, KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977).
19. FORTUNE, May 7, 1979, at 168, col. 2.
20. Noll, supra note 6, at 23.
21. Id. at 24-32.
22. Mashaw, Regulation, Logic and Ideology, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 44, col. 1.
23. Peltzman, supra note 4; see also, Anderson, supra note 10, for a bureaucratic powers maintenance
theory of agency behavior which is also, it seems to me, damaged by the existence of reforms that weaken
agencies drastically or cause them to disappear, let alone agency support of those reforms.
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than a bang, with the disillusioned public waiting exhausted and demoralized for a
new (and presumably equally flawed) regulatory process cycle. None of the theories
suggests that efficiency will be a prime focus or effect of congressional or regulatory
concern with continued government intervention in the economy.
A major problem with theories of regulation is that they are difficult to express
in forms which are rich enough to avoid caricature and yet sufficiently defined to
be refutable. 24 This seems to be especially true of the public interest theory. Formal
efforts to define a social welfare optimum (the "public interest") proceed by
specifying the effect of each alternative world-state on each individual. Then,
depending on the analyst, one continues either by comparing these effects across
individuals or by refusing to do so and accepting as superior only those world-
states that improve (or at least do not worsen) the lot of each individual in the
society. A third possibility is to compare states of the world according to an
objective standard (conformity with religious law, for example) and ignore its
effects on individuals. Accordingly, to determine formally whether a proposed
action is in the public interest seems to require a definition of the public interest
which either is independent of private interests or is linked to private interests
through a social welfare function. In a complicated world, few actions benefit
everyone. And there is rarely sufficient agreement on intrinsic values to allow
judgment of outcomes independently of their effects on individuals. And even
where a Pareto-superior alternative to the status quo exists, it cannot be the
automatic choice (using effects on individuals as a guide) if it benefits some
individuals less than they would be benefited under other, more skewed, ar-
rangements or if there is more than one Pareto-superior choice, each with its own
constellation of bigger and smaller winners. So an action's "unweighted" effects on
individuals cannot determine whether it is in the public interest. And attempting to
weight those interests with a social welfare function (a systematic method of
comparing and summing individual utilities to determine collective good) suffers
from the defects which were the subject of Arrow's famous "impossibility" proof,25
from which formal escape has so far eluded an army of scholars.2 6
What then can we mean by regulation "in the public interest"? Suppose we
sidestep formal specification and look at the problem paradigmatically. At least
three paradigms could be appealed to in asserting that some exercise of the power
of the state is in the public interest. There is an efficiency paradigm which, crudely
stated, says that government activities which increase output are generally in the
public interest. There is a distributional paradigm whose exact content, even
expressed crudely, is the subject of great debate. Basically, it says that distributional
effects are considered in determining the public interest only to the extent that
they exceed a threshold which justifies intervention by the state and then to the
extent that they involve making a specially favored group wealthier or a disfavored
24. Posner, supra note 3, at 343, 348.
25. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 96-100 (2d ed. 1963).
26. Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation, 20 Ami. J. POL. Sci. 5 (1976).
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group poorer. There is probably agreement that infants and the congenitally
infirm are among the favored classes and that criminals (that is, those committing
specific acts which are regarded as punishably immoral) are to be disfavored. After
that, there is much dispute, but fairly wide recognition that there are at least some
favored groups and some disfavored groups, and that it is the proper business of
government to shift wealth toward the former and away from the latter. Indeed,
even Nozick, who is widely thought to represent the minimalist end of the
spectrum in terms of his willingness to redistribute, agrees (however reluctantly)
that there is at least one possible group in favor of whom intervention is justified.2 7
This brings us to a third paradigm, the process paradigm, which says that
government intervention designed to improve efficiency or (especially) to redistrib-
ute wealth must be undertaken in accordance with governmental processes accept-
ed as fair, and that even actions which otherwise resemble the efficiency and
distributional paradigms will not be in the public interest if they are not undertak-
en in a way which satisfies the process paradigm. The reason that actions taken
under the distributional paradigms are singled out for emphasis in accordance with
the process paradigm may lie in a recognition that the sum of efficiency improve-
ments over time is likely to benefit everyone at least a little, while it is very unlikely
that the same will be true of the sum of distributional adjustments. Consensus on
the application of the distribution or efficiency paradigms is often hard to achieve,
so that achieving process acceptability is necessary to ensure acceptance of govern-
ment actions justified by reference to the first two paradigms.
Using a paradigmatic approach hardly allows us to escape all our problems.
The entire range of judgments necessary to determine formally or informally
whether an action is in the public interest is beset with difficulties. Some are so
fundamental as to be essentially unmanageable. For example, when we talk about
"efficiency," we must make a whole set of assumptions which we know are incorrect
as matters of fact. We know that price is not equal to marginal cost everywhere in
the economy, but attempts to take seriously the general theory of second best and
derive policy implications from it have not been very successful. When we talk
about distributional fairness, we know that individual utility functions are not
independent, that A's level of satisfaction with any given bundle of wealth is often
closely linked to how well B is doing. But we do not have any systematic way of
taking this into account which avoids paradox. When we talk about process
fairness, we know that the procedures used to reach a result may profoundly
influence the outcome, yet we cannot construct a neutral agenda.
All we can do in cases like these is to acknowledge the problem with regret and
then fall back on the need to continue to say something about an important human
activity. In this connection, many will find comforting the fact that many of the
predictions derived from flawed positive theories are borne out reasonably well in
practice, and that many of the normative judgements produced by applying flawed
27. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 152-53 (1979).
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value structures through flawed procedures seem to command fairly widespread
allegiance. As Stigler, in a remarkably candid moment, once allowed:
What can the economist respond to a person (say a psychiatrist) who insists that he
does not maximize utility? It would be easy to persuade him that he does not
minimize utility: after all he is alive, and not drinking crankcase oil. It would also
be possible .. .to point to empirical implications of the assumption, but since these
implications began to be developed only about 40 years after the theory was
proposed (1871), what led economists to accept it?
The main reason was introspection. Everyone has irrational foibles: a common
one is to refuse to put extra postage on a letter if one does not have the exact
denomination, thus saving one or two cents, at the cost of a more expensive special
trip to the post office. Yet, by and large, our actions are geared to the goals we seek
to achieve. Introspective evidence will never convince a skeptic, and perhaps the
only remarkable thing about introspection on utility maximizing is that virtually
every economist found it convincing over so long a period. -8
There are other problems which seem less fundamental. In the end, techniques
used to deal with them differ from those we use to deal with the ur-problems only
in that we are less anxious when we use them. For example, one could object that
the public interest paradigm may well have the features posited above, but that
establishing the content of the public interest paradigm does not also establish that
people engaged in considering or evaluating regulation actually use this paradigm
in doing so. Once again, one probably can never convince a committed skeptic. But
repeated and persistent use of public interest language by both proponents and
opponents of regulation leaves one with the choice of either assuming that they are
proceeding with reference to the "public interest" language they are using, or
adopting the more heroic position that, when they talk about public interest, they
are pursuing something else. In fact, Posner has identified the tendency toward the
latter as a weakness in revisionist theory.
2 9
All this allows us to assert operationally that regulation which reduces efficiency
while redistributing wealth in favor of a group not widely accepted as especially
deserving is not in the public interest. It follows also that governmental activity
which increases efficiency while redistributing in favor of a group widely regarded
as deserving is in the public interest. No activity undertaken outside acceptable
process limits (e.g., through secret influence or bribery) ordinarily is regarded as in
the public interest. After that, and particularly when the activity results in conse-
quences which can be characterized as "efficient but maldistributed," or "inefficient
but fair," the matter becomes much harder, But, even in such hard cases, argu-
ment proceeds by reference to the paradigms. Thus, an advocate of a program
argues that his group is deserving and downplays inefficiencies, or an advocate for
a broader consumer group will tend to emphasize the efficiencies that will be
produced by a proposal and tend to minimize distributional impacts on specific
groups. And if fraud is to be undertaken in the pursuit of public policy, it centers
on false claims of efficiency or of misrepresentation of' beneficiaries (as when
28. G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 59-60 (3d ed. 1966).
29. Posner, supra note 3, at 355.
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agribusinesses use the plight of nearly nonexistent poor family farmers to justify a
crop or water subsidy). As noted above, this paradigmatic approach has the virtue
of being consistent with the public-interest-dominated rhetoric of debates about
regulation, where the revisionist theories must postulate not merely some fraud and
dissembling in debate, but an entire process which fraudulently avoids discussing the
"real" issues at stake.3 0
So, public interest theory of airline regulation would posit that, unless it either
increased efficiency or provided a wealth shift in favor of a group recognized by
consensus as worthy of support, or (preferably) both, airline regulation could not
be created or, if created (by mistake or by pressure designed to mislead Congress),
could not be maintained.
With this in mind, let us examine airline deregulation and, through it, the
genesis of airline regulation itself. Both Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)-initiated
and congressionally-mandated revisions in domestic airline regulation had the
following characteristics unaccounted for by revisionist theories:
(1) They involved less control, not more, over the activities of the airline
industry. This gave the agency and Congress less discretion and less
ability to deliver services to geographical constituents or private firms
who had previously benefited from the exercise of regulatory discretion.
It diminished considerably the power of the agency to create economic
rents or to transfer wealth.3 '
(2) Airline deregulation reduced both the size and the power of the CAB. :
(3) Airline deregulation was promoted as efficiency-increasing and was
administered to pursue that goal. Deviations that were made from
promoting efficient outcomes were made knowingly and as minor excep-
tions to insure the political survival of a program that, on the whole,
removed many more redistributionist interventions than it added. For
example, the small communities service guarantee program written into
the Act removes the Board's power to create rents and transfer them
through cross-subsidy. It requires the CAB to identify explicitly the
service it is subsidizing and the cost to the taxpayer for providing such
service. By revisionist analysis, this should reduce the Board's ability to
overprovide service, since the overprovision can be identified readily
and its cost known to those who support it without benefiting from it. 33
And, in fact, since deregulation, subsidized service has been tailored
30. Id. Posner identifies the rhetoric problem, and attempts a revisionist reconciliation.
31. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705; especially 92 Stat 1744, 1745, 1746,
1747, 49 U.S.C. 1551. This act ends government economic regulation of both entry and rates by 1983 and
mandates the demise of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) by 1985. In the interim, it also reduces
considerably CAB discretion in dealing with many other previous objects of regulation such as charter
flights, agreements between airlines, mergers, et cetera.
32. Id.
33. See the new § 419 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended by the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C. 1389) and compare it to the broad discretion embodied in "old" § 406 (49 U.S.C.
1376 (1958)).
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much more closely to actual demand than was previously the case.
(4) The political appeal of airline deregulation was to a large, undif-
ferentiated mass of airline consumers, many of whom were not regular
users. If anything, heavy business users of airline services may have
lost through deregulation subsidies in the form of excessive service
frequency and seat access which were being supported to them by over-
charging infrequent discretionary travelers.:3
4
(5) The airline industry resisted deregulation strenuously. This industry was
well organized and well financed and, by Downsian analysis, should have
been disproportionately influential in the legislative and regulatory pro-
cess. But its preference for contrived regulation violated both the
efficiency and distribution paradigms of the public interest theory articu-
lated above.3 5
(6) After initial resistance, the CAB not only supported, but actively pro-
moted, airline deregulation and its own sunset in 1985.31) This is not
accounted for by revisionist histories of regulation, nor is either CAB
support for deregulation nor the ultimate congressional endorsement of
deregulation easily reconciled with "iron triangle" theories.
How can we accommodate these awkward events within the existing consensus
theories about regulation? Perhaps one could explain that those in charge of the
CAB during the relevant period were not "typical" bureaucrats because they were
tenured academics or "professional deregulators" 3 7 or both. But this explanation
has several difficulties. First, the revisionist theories of regulation do not posit the
character of the bureaucrats as a variable. 3 3 Rather, they posit basic forces, acting
on agencies and on the Congress, which will produce the results they predict
regardless of who is running the agency or, alternatively, which will operate to select
regulators who are comfortable "delivering the goods" in accordance with revisionist
theories. In a sense, the character of bureaucrats is for the revisionists a dependent,
rather than independent, variable. Second, deregulation was supported by former
practicing (nontenured) lawyers John Robson in the Ford administration and
Marvin Cohen, Alfred Kahn's successor, as well as by other members of the Board
and the Board's staff. Their backgrounds were fairly typical of those appointed to
or staffing regulatory commissions, and they certainly did not all have assured
fall-back alternatives. Could they all have been atypical? And if it is possible for an
entire agency to be atypical in a fundamental way for a period of four years, how
robust can the consensus theory of agency behavior theory be?
34. G. DOUGLAS &J. MILLER, ECONOIic REULAT ION (F DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORTATION 87-94, 103
(1974).
35. A. DOWNS, supra note 8.
36. Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings on H.R. 11145 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transport., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122-186 (1978) (testimony of Alfred Kahn,
Chairman CAB).
37. Anderson, supra note 10, at 19.
38. Supra note 4.
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Imposition of airline deregulation over the opposition of the industry and the
aviation bar is flatly inconsistent with the Stigler hypothesis and the capture
hypothesis. It is possible to explain in terms of the lawyer-dominance hypothesis,
the Peltzman hypothesis, and the Posner taxation hypothesis only if the actors and
claimants preferred to play in one spectacular, but short-lived, "G6tterdimmerung,"
rather than an essentially endless series of more modest dramas. Eliminating rate
regulation 39 on the upside as well as the downside is difficult to reconcile with the
Peltzman modification of the Stigler theory, since it leaves the agency in no
position to continue to alternate in bestowing benefits on the industry and user
groups. Entry control was eliminated without any clear knowledge on anyone's part
as to which firms would benefit and which would be harmed. What had been
established by the California and Texas examples was that less control on entry
would benefit the public and some firms which were difficult to identify, probably
at the expense of other established carriers.
4 0
But all of these awkward facts are consistent with a story that goes something
like this: In 1938, it appeared to the general public and the Congress that
uncontrolled markets did not work very well for the public over the long run.
Although markets produced low prices during the Depression years, many produc-
ers went out of business. The airline business was relatively new, Congress had
little experience with it, and there was no reason not to apply general skepticism
about markets to airlines. Doubts about airline markets were reinforced by the fact
that firms were continuing to attempt entry. Notwithstanding this dismal picture, a
modern analyst would say that these firms were looking past the Depression at a
bright future for a new technology. But it seemed to Congress that mistakenly
optimistic entrepreneurs were seeking profitable operations where none were
possible, draining away resources needed for further extension of the airline
system in fruitless and profitless competitive struggles for existing business. Firms
which had invested substantial resources in pioneering air transportation would
become the innocent victims of still another example of market competition run
riot.
It was therefore not difficult for the airline industry to persuade Congress and
the public that the fledgling airline industry would go the way of many other
Depression-era firms and that the full potential of aviation could not be developed
in a free-market environment. This would be both inefficient and unfair. Whether
the industry sincerely believed this, merely hoped for the benefits of cartelization,
or both, is immaterial. It made its case. Trucking had been regulated too recently
for the deleterious long-term effects of regulation to become known. The enor-
mous overinvestment in railroad plants4 1 masked any rents that ICC railroad
regulation might have been generating for private firms. The damage to the
39. Posner, supra note 29.
40. Levine, supra note 2. See 1 Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judician, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 525-33 (1975) (statement of Charles A. Murphy).
41. Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J. L. & E(:oN. 87, 110 (1966).
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interests of the public as a whole from cross-subsidy, as well as its limited
effectiveness in securing the desired services, were not well understood, while
regional infrastructural development through public intervention had been charac-
teristic of anti-Depression strategy. And there was enough faith in what Mashaw
has called "the ideology of government efficacy"'4 2 for the Congress and the public
to believe that an expert agency could secure for the public most of the benefits of
competition without subjecting the public to the disadvantages of its "excesses."
Whatever its vices, this story has the singular virtue of being consistent with the
legislative history of the 1938 Act.43 This history, which many (including myself'1 4 )
have tried with only indifferent success to square with the Stigler government-
services theory, contains numerous statements (including Senate floor manager
McCarran's well-known remarks denying that entry control would protect incum-
bents from the threat of future competition4 5 ) which seem to suggest that Congress
was not intentionally freezing entry nor thereby creating a cartel for the sole
benefit of the airlines and a few isolated geographic areas. While it is not hard for
an experienced observer of the legislative process to generate the cynicism neces-
sary to turn the legislative history as it is into one that will support the currently-
held theory of regulatory origin, less adjustment of this history is required to
accept the modified public-interest hypothesis. This modified theory says that
airline regulation was imposed by a Congress which, while attempting to act in the
public interest, made a mistake.
Of course, the industry was eloquent in its predictions of the benefits of
regulation and of the ruin impending without it. But most of those arguments
were cast in a form designed to appeal to the efficiency paradigm or, alternatively,
42. Mashaw, supra note 20, at 58.
43. See C. S. RHYNE, CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED (1939); see also 83 CON;. REC., parts 5-10
(1938).
44. E.g., Levine, supra note 2, at 1420; Levine, Regulating Airmail Transportation, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 317,
325 (1975).
45. 83 CONG. REC. 6852 (1938).
It is the public in whom we are interested: that is the primary consideration. The bill has in
contemplation that service (to the public) all the way through, but, together with that, we must remember
that those who sought to serve the public in this field, either under no law at all or under the existing law,
which is known as the McKellar-Black law, or other existing laws, should have some recognition as
pioneers, we will say. There is nothing in this bill and nothing in the spirit of the bill or in the philosophy
of the bill that would take from those pioneers anything that they have established. On the other hand, we
desire to give them the best of "the break," if I may use a common expression.
Again referring to public necessity and convenience, permit me to use an illustration with which the
Senator is familiar. If it could be established to the satisfaction of the Authority which is about to be set up
that another line could well be operated from Chicago to Salt Lake City, although that same territory is
now served by the United Air Lines, and the demand for service was so great as to support another line,
then the Authority could investigate, reach a determination, establish a rule, and could say, "There is
sufficient demand, there is sufficient patronage, and there is sufficient commercial life to sustain the other
lines. Therefore we can grant a franchise to another line." But before that could be done, full and
complete hearings would have to be had. So we are trying to set up a non-political agency that will go into
matters such as the one I have tried to illustrate, and if the circumstances do not justify anotherline, say
"No, you cannot go in; you cannot set up another line, because if you do both lines will fail; both lines will
go out of business, and the public that we are looking to primarily will not be served." That is the object
and purpose of this entire bill. It is not to say that any line may be "frozen" or that an) line may be
perpetuated, nor that any monopoly over any terrain may be established to the exclusion of the necessity
which the public may present.
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to line up the industry as a worthy secondary legatee in its own right with the
traveling and shipping public, the post office, and the national defense as the
prime beneficiaries of a governmentally-stabilized airline industry. The revisionist
account requires that we posit that, in seeking regulation, the administration and
the members of Congress were motivated primarily by the potential wealth gains to
the industry, and that all were cynical enough to focus their rhetoric principally on
public gains known to be illusory. An experienced Washington observer probably
would not want to reject such a possibility out of hand for an individual instance;
but, as a general hypothesis, it is sufficiently strained that one would wish to assert
it only if the evidence seemed to require it. Before the recent spate of deregulations
justified on public-interest grounds, the evidence seemed that way to many of us.
But the material presented here on airline deregulation suggests that perhaps
public interest rhetoric accurately reflects the intentions of legislators and bureau-
crats much more often than we had supposed. Using hindsight, the "obvious"
benefits to the public may have been greatly overstated, but it is surely simpler and
more consistent with a long view of the evidence to assume mistake on the part of
a Congress and a Roosevelt administration trying to benefit the public at large than
to insist on the existence of a widely-coordinated effort by government to transfer
wealth from the general public to the airlines.
Over time, scholarly assessments of the performance of the regulated industry
suggested that airlines operated better without regulation. Congressional leaders
thought it politically beneficial, and perhaps even consistent with their legislative
duty, to make changes which might benefit the public. Although the factors de-
scribed by Downs, 4 6 Posner,47 and Stigler 4 8 undoubtedly affected both the original
legislation and its revision, those forces (in the form of industry and sectional
pressure for favored treatment) operated as a deflection rather than the main
thrust of either regulation or its revision. In the meantime, this scholary output, as
well as observations that all was not as well as it could be in the regulated industry,
led to the appointment of regulators who were prepared to make important
changes in the direction of efficiency, even at the expense of agency power.
In the executive and administrative contexts, Robson and the Ford administra-
tion began the process of educating Congress and the public to the ills produced
by airline regulation and to the potential benefits of' deregulation. Senator Kennedy
gave the process major impetus in the Senate through the 1975 hearings before his
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. :'9 Certainly the industry
opposed deregulation, as did many members of Congress and the public, and this
opposition was reflected in the timidity of the CAB's early efforts, as well as in the
restrained tone of early legislative proposals. But at least some of the industry and
public opposition, and much of the congressional skepticism, stemmed from
46. Supra note 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Oversight of Civil Aeronautic Board Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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uncertainty about the effects of dismantling a system that had produced at least
minimally satisfactory results for forty years. This uncertainty was reinforced by
the fact that the particular misallocation produced by CAB regulation had been
airline service which was better in many respects than that which the market
otherwise would have provided at high prices that excluded many potential
customers. Since the service was present, identifiable and tangible, while the price
savings and the excluded masses were hypothetical and not associated with easily
identifiable individuals, would-be deregulators had a difficult time convincing
skeptics of the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" genre. In fact, the demonstrable price
and service benefits of California and Texas intrastate experiments with competi-
tion were probably indispensible to the task of persuading skeptics that the
apparently satisfactory CAB-regulated system, in fact, was not functioning in the
public interest.
But the telling fact for our purposes is that this initially doubtful congressional
faction (including Senator Cannon, the powerful chairman of both the Aviation
Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee) ultimately helped control the
legislative process in favor of deregulation, which by then was perceived to be in
the public interest. And it did so in the face of diehard opposition by factions
(including the industry) whose positions were undermined by the ultimate trans-
parency of the degree to which their positions were motivated by purely private,
rather than "public-interest" considerations of gain and loss. And, on the adminis-
trative side, even conceding that Chairman Kahn and his chief staff aides had
relatively little to lose by the diminution of CAB power, these changes were
supported by an initially skeptical but ultimately convinced career staff and by
members of the Board who were prepared to see their own power diminished for
the benefit of the public.
This scenario may seem painfully quaint to most readers. It is certainly not
self-evidently correct. But it is consistent with the rhetoric of the legislative and
administrative history, with the facts of airline deregulation, and with the existence
of a broader movement to deregulate other industries as well. Ockham's razor 5 0
(the principle that simple explanations are to be preferred to complicated ones, all
else being equal), if nothing else, requires that we give serious attention to this
hypothesis. And this account of the dynamics of airline regulation is consistent with
preliminary work done by Mashaw, 5 1 with respect to the origins of the 1962 drug
regulation, and by Kitch,52 with respect to the origins of the ICC Act.
Much work needs to be done. As always, it will be done better if performed
with an open mind. Ultimately, it may be possible to synthesize a modification of
the public-interest theory using the work that forms the underpinning of the
current consensus on regulation. Such a synthesis will not require us to revise
50. E. A. Moody, William of Ockham, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 306, 307 (reprint ed.
P. Edwards, 1972).
51. Mashaw, supra note 22.
52. E. Kitch, Economics of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and Its Antecedents (1979)
(unpublished manuscript in M. E. Levine's files, copy available on request).
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carefully buttressed scholarly views of the inefficiency of regulation or (o deny that
there exist powerful incentives for private groups to attempt to obtain particular
regulatory benefits. But a new public interest theory will require us to reassess the
prospects for the persistence of regulation demonstrated to be inefficient and
undesirable. In this as well as other areas, it may be that the political process
produces better results than theorists can account for.

